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GLOBAL LAWS, LOCAL LIVES: IMPACT OF
THE NEW REGIONALISM ON HUMAN
RIGHTS COMPLIANCE
Stephen Joseph Powell and Patricia Camino Pirez*
INTRODUCTION
Historically, economists have advocated for the exclusion of human
rights provisions from trade agreements.' However, in recent years, a grow-
ing number of economists begrudgingly acknowledge the incontrovertible,
although presently dysfunctional, link between trade and human rights, and
the need to integrate these two policies. Continuation of the brisk pace of
international economic growth with its necessarily increased use of natural
resources - often at unsustainable levels - and its high levels of pollution -
often at the cost of citizen health - combine with the rules of the global
trading system to threaten human rights to health, to freedom from forced or
child labor, to non-discrimination, to a fair wage, to a healthy environment,
even to democratic governance and participation in the political process. 2
In light of the slow progress in the recognition of human rights by
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the recent boom in regional trade
* Professor Powell teaches international trade law courses at the University of
Florida's Levin College of Law and directs the College's International Trade Law
Program. Before joining the College, Powell was for 17 years Chief Counsel for
Import Administration in the U.S. Department of Commerce. Ms. Camino Pdrez
was awarded the J.D. degree from the Levin College of Law in 2009 and practices
law in South Florida. We borrowed the title, "Global Laws, Local Lives," from
BERTA ESPERANZA HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & STEPHEN J. POWELL, JUST TRADE: A
NEW COVENANT LINKING TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS ch. 3 (2009), which provides
a useful framework for this article.
I Robert Howse and Makua Matua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global Econ-
omy: Challenges for the World Trade Organization, RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY 11,
Jan. 2000, available at http://www.dd-rd.calsite/_PDF/publications/globalization/
wto/protecting-human-rightsWTO.pdf ("Alarmingly, the notion developed that
measures might only be justified under Article XX if no less trade restrictive alter-
native could be imagined to achieve the policy objectives in question. Since neo-
classical economists can almost always find some policy instrument other than
trade restriction that could hypothetically, and without regard to real world costs,
achieve a given policy objective, this interpretation amounted to making Article
XX largely superfluous.").
2 Stephen J. Powell, Regional Economic Arrangements and the Rule of Law in
the Americas: The Human Rights Face of Free Trade Agreements, 17 FLA. J. INT'L
L. 59, 63 (2005). See HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note *, at 4-5.
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agreements (RTAs), human rights advocates are now examining whether
RTAs may be more effective and efficient avenues for human rights en-
forcement within the global trading system, given the impossibility that
trade rules can any longer afford to ignore their widespread effects on
human rights. Giving particular focus to the rich history of RTAs in the
Western Hemisphere, this paper explores the recent RTAs as vehicles for
compliance with a variety of U.N.-mandated human rights, in a manner that
is consistent with the fundamental rules of the trading system.
Part I begins by describing the recent increase in RTAs under "new
regionalism." Part II explores the protection of human rights standards in
recent RTAs in the Western Hemisphere by providing a close evaluation of
RTA provisions concerning labor rights, environmental protection, intellec-
tual property protection, and protection of the intellectual property of indig-
enous peoples, commonly referred to as "traditional knowledge." Part III
briefly analyzes the costs and benefits of including human rights in RTAs.
Finally, we conclude that states have moral, legal, and economic obligations
to take advantage of these possibilities to achieve greater integration of
human rights in the trade rules formed by RTA and offer recommendations
toward combining increased economic growth with improved well-being of
their civil societies.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS
A. History of Regional Trade Agreements and the World Trade
Organization
RTAs have been a feature of the world trading system since the late
1950s.1 In the 1980s, the uncertainty of a successful conclusion to the Uru-
guay Round of multilateral trade negotiations prompted an increased inter-
est in regionalism. 4 However, the surprisingly successful conclusion of the
Uruguay Round and the establishment of the WTO did not diminish interest
in RTAs.5 In fact, there has been a boom in RTA negotiations in the last
decade and a half.6 Reports show that Members notified as many as ten
3 T.N. SRINIVASAN, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE MULTILATERAL TRADING
SYSTEM: FROM THE GATT TO THE URUGUAY ROUND AND THE FUTURE 59 (West-
view Press 1998); see WTO, Regional Trade Agreements, http://rtais.wto.org/Ul/
PublicAllRTAList.aspx (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
4 SRINIVASAN, supra note 3, at 59.
5 Id. at 60-61.
6 See WTO, Regional Trade Agreements Gateway, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop e/region e/region.e.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
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RTAs to the WTO in the short period from July 2009 to October 2009.7 The
currently stalled Doha Round negotiations,8 which emphasize "problems
developing countries face in implementing the current WTO agreements,"
and the expansion of globalization into increasingly domestic regulatory
arenas have formed "the perfect storm" for another surge of RTAs.
The emergence of RTAs does not necessarily conflict with WTO
rules or the global trading system. As we will show, RTAs provide an ave-
nue for trade liberalization in areas that the WTO has yet to address. In
addition, RTAs may also provide for the advancement of areas in trade that
are difficult to address and enforce at a global level.
Although the concept of RTAs might seem contrary to the WTO's
agenda of promoting global free trade, an exception provision in the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) permits the maintenance of
RTAs despite their discriminatory central attractions. Article I of the
GATT, the Most-Favored-Nation Clause, restricts WTO Members from dis-
criminating against the imports of other Members based on the country of
origin.' 0 Article XXIV, however, provides Members with a way around this
clause by providing a special exception where members may enter into
preferential trade agreements if they meet strict criteria." These standards
include RTA notification requirements, information provisions, and trans-
parency requirements.12 The WTO recently enacted the Transparency
Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements' 3 to "ensur[e] that regional
7 Goods Chair Says 10 New Regional Trade Agreements Notified to the WTO,
WTO NEWS, Oct. 30, 2009 (World Trade Organization), http://www.wto.org/
english/news-e/news09_e/good_30octO9_e.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
8 See, e.g., Raj Bhala, Resurrecting the Doha Round: Devilish Details, Grand
Themes, and China Too, 45 TEX. INT'L L. J. 1, 5 (2009).
9 World Trade Organization, Doha Development Agenda: Negotiations, imple-
mentation and development, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dda-e/ddae.htm
(last visited May 18, 2011).
10 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. I, Jan. 1, 1948, 55 U.N.T.S. 194-
95 [hereafter GATT].
I Id. at 268-72.
12 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, art. XXIV,
1867 U.N.T.S. 219-21, 33 I.L.M. 34-36 (1994), in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RE-
SULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 31-33,
522-25 (Geneva: GATT Secretariat 1994).
'3 WTO General Council, Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agree-
ments, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/region-e/transmecha-e.htm (last vis-
ited Feb. 1, 2011).
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trade agreements become building blocks, not stumbling blocks, to world
trade."' 4 The Transparency Mechanism requires Members to give early no-
tification to the WTO of new RTA negotiations.' 5 Formal notification is
required once WTO Members ratify the RTA, which must include ex-
tremely detailed information about the agreement.' 6 The WTO Secretariat
then makes a factual presentation, which is followed by a single formal
meeting of the Members.' 7
Currently, about ninety percent of RTAs are free trade agreements
(FTAs), with the rest being customs unions." The principal difference be-
tween the two integration instruments is that parties to a customs union
have not only lowered tariff barriers among themselves, but have harmo-
nized their tariffs with respect to imports into the territory of the customs
union.'0 Although the requirement of a report and recommendation regard-
ing new RTAs may seem beneficial, the actual benefit of these new trans-
parency mechanisms remains uncertain. 20 Even if the committees
evaluating these agreements remain efficient, the prospective increase of
RTAs may very well overwhelm the process. In addition, commentators
believe that because every WTO Member is a party to at least one RTA, it
is likely that WTO Members are under pressure to refrain from being criti-
cal of other RTAs. 2 1
Although Members have not notified all RTAs to the WTO, it is
safe to assume that most RTAs have indeed been submitted for approval. 22
Members have notified 474 RTAs to the WTO or to its predecessor, the
14 WTO, 2006 News Items - Lamy Welcomes WTO Agreement on Regional Trade
Agreements, http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news06 e/rta-julyO6_e.htm (last
visited Feb. 11, 2011).
15 Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements, supra note 13.
16 Id.
'7 Id.
'8 WTO, Regional Trade Agreements Gateway, supra note 6.
19 DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J. SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW:
PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 92 (2008); see also CHRIS WOLD ET AL.,
TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT - LAW AND POLICY 71 (2005).
20 DAVID GANTz, REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: LAW, POLICY AND PRACTICE
41 (2009).
21 See id.
22 See id. at 57 (arguing that since there are 153 Members that are party to the
WTO, it is unlikely that there are a significant number of RTAs that do not have at
least one WTO Member; consequently, most all RTAs would be required to notify
itself to the GATT).
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GATT. 23 Most of these RTAs were notified to the WTO in accordance with
the notification requirement of GATT Article XXIV (7)(a).24 The recent
appearance of numerous RTAs has laid the foundation for a serious debate
regarding their costs and benefits. This debate involves matters ranging
from economic and political issues to security and human rights issues. 25
The WTO believes that regional and multilateral integration could be com-
plimentary in view of the fact that some members of regional agreements
have accepted higher levels of obligation than those existing in earlier mul-
tilateral negotiations. 26 As such, these agreements would lay a foundation
for future multilateral progress in those areas not yet covered by multilateral
agreements. 27
The United States has been a key player in the recent boom of
RTAs in the twenty-first century. Since 2000, the United States has formed
regional trade agreements with several countries in the Americas including
Chile, Peru, Mexico, Canada, the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, El Sal-
vador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.28 In addition, the United
States has been an active participant in the proliferation of RTAs with geo-
graphically distant countries, which include, among others, Jordan, Singa-
pore, Australia, Morocco, and Bahrain.2 9
B. The Fall of Old Regionalism and the Rise of New Regionalism
What has been dubbed old regionalism was characterized by re-
gional trade agreements formed in the bipolar, Cold War context of the
23 WTO, Regional Trade Agreements Gateway, supra note 6.
24 Id.; see also GATT, supra note 10, at 523 art. XXIV (7)(a) ("Any contracting
party deciding to enter into a customs union or free-trade area, or an interim agree-
ment leading to the formation of such a union or area, shall promptly notify the
CONTRACTING PARTIES and shall make available to them such information
regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them to make such reports and
recommendations to contracting parties as they may deem appropriate.").
25 See Export-Import Bank of India, Regional Trade Agreements: Gateway to
Global Trade 13, Occasional Paper No. 120 (Oct. 2007), available at http:/www.
eximbankindia.com/op/op I 20.pdf.
26 SRINIVASAN, supra note 3, at 61, 140.
27 Id.
28 Brian Cimbolic, The Impact of Regional Trade Areas on International Intellec-
tual Property Rights, 48 IDEA 53, 58 (2007).
29 See Trade Agreements: Office of the United States Representative, http://www.
ustr.gov/trade-agreements (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
2011 121
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1960s and 1970s.30 The goal of regional trade agreements during this period
was to substitute imports using strong protectionist standards.31 Old region-
alism depicted foreign exports with skepticism. States were wary of any
future scenario where they would become dependent on foreign products. 32
The debt crisis of the 1980s caused a recession of RTAs where regionalism
technically shut down.33 The resurgence of regionalism a few years later
marked the beginning phases of what is now known as "new regionalism."
New regionalism has a number of focal characteristics that give it
shape. Contrary to old regionalism, new regionalism was formed in a multi-
polar environment where former superpowers became regional powers
competing with emerging regional powers.34 In this context, RTAs are fur-
ther characterized as having a more comprehensive and multidimensional
structure that not only includes economically oriented objectives, but also
environmental, political, social, and democratic objectives. 35 New regional-
ism is also considered to be more compatible with the multilateral structure
and interdependent economies that define present global relations.3 6 As a
result, trade liberalization was extended to all member partners and oc-
curred through non-tariff and non-border reforms such as mutual recogni-
tion of product standards, as well as customs harmonization. 37 New
regionalism is also distinguished by its framework provisions that allow for
the involvement of non-state actors.38 This outcome follows the tenets of
the new regionalism, under which any country willing to accept the condi-
tions of the agreement is welcome. As noted above, the result is the
proliferation of trade agreements between developed and emerging market
countries.
30 Bjorn Hettne, The United Nations and Conflict Management: The Role of the
"New Regionalism", 4 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 643, 653 (1994).
31 See Robert Devlin & Antoni Estevadeordal, Inter-American Development
Bank, What's New in the New Regionalism in the Americas?, Working Paper No. 6,
(2001).
32 Id. at 3, 14.
33 Id. at 5, 20.
34 Hettne, supra note 30, at 653.
35 Chun Hung Lin, Regionalism or Globalism? The Process of Telecommunica-
tion Cooperation Within the OAS and NAFTA, 11 CURRENTS: INT'L TRADE L. J. 30,
32 (2002); Hettne, supra note 30, at 653.
36 Hettne, supra note 30, at 653.
37 Hung Lin, supra note 35, at 32.
38 Hettne, supra note 30, at 653.
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II. THE INTEGRATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS INTO REGIONAL
TRADE AGREEMENTS
International trade laws were designed to allow parties to make full
use of their comparative advantage to break down barriers and promote
freer trade. The WTO achieves this purpose primarily through several non-
discrimination provisions supporting the free movement of goods. As noted,
the Most-Favored-Nation Clause in the WTO's GATT requires that a WTO
Member must accord to the products of every other Member any advantage
or privilege that the Member accords to the like products from any nation. 39
Similarly, the WTO's National Treatment Clause requires Members to treat
foreign products "no less favorably" than they treat "like" domestic prod-
ucts. 4 0 Although these trade rules work to achieve freer trade, they have
weakened the government's ability to promote sustainable development, re-
duce the growing gap between rich and poor, protect core labor standards,
and preserve indigenous identities.41
Although the WTO agreement makes no direct reference to human
rights, an arsenal of WTO provisions could be used to promote conscious
integration of human rights in trade agreements. 42 The World Trade Court43
has in the past interpreted some WTO provisions as pertaining to human
rights by embracing the use of public international law, including custom-
3 GATT, supra note 10, at 486-87.
40 Stephen J. Powell, The Place of Human Rights Law in World Trade Organiza-
tion Rules, 16 FLA. J. INT'L L. 219, 222 (2004).
41 See WOLD, supra note 19, at 168.
42 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Trade Law: Defin-
ing and Connecting the Two Fields, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
29, 63 (Thomas Cottier, et al. eds., 2005). See Stephen J. Powell & Paola A.
Chavarro, Seventh Annual Conference on Legal & Policy Issues in the Americas:
Toward a Vibrant Peruvian Middle Class: Effects of the Peru-United States Free
Trade Agreement on Labor Rights, Biodiversity, and Indigenous Populations, 20
FLA. J. INT'L L. 93, 97 (2008).
43 We use this substantially more descriptive term instead of "Appellate Body,"
the unfortunate title conferred by the WTO. As explained in HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL
AND POWELL, supra note *, at n. 7 to ch. 2, the name "more accurately situates the
[Appellate Body] within the international law dispute settlement system" because it
is the final arbiter of international trade disputes among states. See Understanding
on the Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Annex 2, 1869
U.N.T.S. 401, 417-19 (1995), 33 I.L.M. 1226, 1236-37 (1994), in THE LEGAL
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTI-
ATIONs 404, 417-19 (1994).
2011 123
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ary and treaty sources of human rights law." Specifically, the World Trade
Court's interpretation of GATT Article XX has paved the way for the ele-
vation of human rights issues over economic ones. 4 5 Article XX can be used
to protect human rights because it allows for trade limitations that serve to
protect public morals, protect human, animal, or plant life or health, and
conserve natural resources.4 6 These rules clearly are relevant to the protec-
tion of a variety of human rights.
Since the creation of the WTO, there has been a shift away from
multilateral trade agreements toward regional and bilateral agreements. To-
day, RTAs build on World Trade Court interpretations by supplying rules
explicitly linking market values to standards protecting human rights. 47
These standards add important protections to those considered relevant by
the WTO. 4 8 Several economically powerful countries are now changing the
politics and agenda of trade agreements by advancing human rights princi-
ples through the use of RTAs. 4 9 The United States, for example, will not
consider entering into a trade partnership with most countries unless these
countries demonstrate that their governments have made and continue to
make domestic commitments toward the protection of human rights. 0
Only a handful of developed countries and a limited number of
emerging market countries have taken on the task of linking trade and so-
cial protection in RTAs. 5' Numerous RTAs promise to "[p]romote eco-
nomic development in a manner consistent with environmental protection
and conservation and with sustainable development." 52 Other agreements
reaffirm the commitment of the parties to human rights values without fur-
ther explanation or insight into how these commitments are associated with
the core elements of the agreement.53 Some include provisions that set "pos-
44 Powell & Chavarro, supra note 42, at 95.
45 Id.
46 GATT, supra note 10, at 519-20.
47 See EMILIE M. HAFNER-BURTON, FORCED TO BE GOOD: WHY TRADE AGREE-
MENTS BoosT HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (2009).
48 Id. at 7.
49 Id. at 4.
50 Id. at 147.
51 See Lorand Bartels, Social Issues: Labour, Environment and Human Rights, in
BILATERAL AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS
342, 345 (Simon Lester & Bryan Mercurio eds., 2009).
52 See, e.g., Preamble to the Free Trade Agreement between the Governments of
Central America and Chile, available at http://www.comex.go.cr/acuerdos/chile/
Texto%20del%20acuerdolPreambulo.pdf.
53 Bartels, supra note 51, at 346.
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itive social standards" in the territories of the parties. 54 In general, the pro-
tections embedded in these RTAs focus on three main areas of human
rights: labor rights, environmental protection, and protection of the intellec-
tual property critical to indigenous populations.
A. RTAs and the Integration of Labor Rights
1. Labor Rights in International Trade
Since 1919, the main instruments promoting international labor
standards have been the labor conventions adopted by the International La-
bor Organization (LO). 5 5 In 1998, the ILO adopted the Declaration of Fun-
damental Principles and Rights at Work, which established certain core
labor standards: the freedom of association and the right to engage in col-
lective bargaining, the elimination of forced labor, the elimination of child
labor, and the elimination of employment discrimination. 56 These core labor
standards parallel the international labor standards referenced in several
human rights agreements, including the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights, and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.57 While
the ILO's core standards certainly represent the most fundamental labor
protections, it is important to note that agreement could not be reached on
the inclusion of other extremely important worker rights, such as the right
to fair wage and reasonable rest.
The linkage between trade and labor rights has become one of the
most contentious issues in trade and labor policy debates.58 Although there
are several well-founded rationales for linking the two, leaders of emerging
market countries passionately oppose enforcing labor restrictions through
trade sanctions. 59 This opposition stems from the fear that concessions to
labor standards will reduce the advantage of emerging markets in the global
54 Id.
5 Virginia A. Leary, "Form Follows Function": Formulations of International
Labor Standards - Treaties, Codes, Soft Law, Trade Agreements, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION, TRADE AND PUBLIC POLICY 179
(Robert J. Flanagan & William B. Gould IV eds., 2003).
56 Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, Trade Policy & Labor Standards, 14
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 261, 263 (2005).
5 Id.
58 Id. at 261.
59 Powell & Chavarro, supra note 42, at 97.
2011 125
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trading system.60 Studies suggest that developed countries have superior la-
bor and health conditions. 61 Thus, companies in the emerging markets be-
lieve they will never gain the economic ability to achieve such conditions
until these developing countries industrialize using lower working stan-
dards, as did today's developed countries in the past.62 Consequently, trade-
enforced labor standards would continue to give the developed countries a
comparative advantage.
Emerging market countries also argue that implementing higher la-
bor standards as a condition in trade agreements could be used as a dis-
guised form of protectionism by developed countries, 63 thus aggravating an
already unequal distribution of trade's bounty.6 However, the ILO's Work
Declaration specifically disclaims any use of labor standards for protection-
ist purposes, which provides a firm basis for a dispute settlement chal-
lenge.65 Nevertheless, many countries continue to fear that high labor
standards in trade agreements will open the door for developed countries to
protect their domestic producers.
The opposing view is that emerging market countries that do not
adopt core labor standards gain a competitive advantage over countries that
do abide by these standards. 66 Exporting nations that produce goods by
processes that fail to comply with fundamental worker protections would be
engaging in unfair competition, ultimately depriving countries that do abide
by these standards of their legitimate market share.67
The LO Constitution states that "the failure of any nation to adopt
humane conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations
which desire to improve the conditions in their own countries."68 The ILO
mostly pursues its mandate through investigations, public reporting, and
60 See Christian Barry & Sanjay G. Reddy, International Trade and Labor Stan-
dards: A Proposal for Linkage, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 545, 574 (2006).
61 Robert J. Flanagan, Labor Standards and International Competitive Advantage,
in INTERNATIONAL LABOR STANDARDS: GLOBALIZATION, TRADE AND PUBLIC PoL-
Icy 26 (Robert J. Flanagan & William B. Gould IV eds., 2003).
62 See Powell & Chavarro, supra note 42, at 97.
63 Flanagan, supra note 61, at 15.
6 Andrea R. Schmidt, A New Trade Policy for America: Do Labor and Environ-
mental Provisions in Trade Agreements Serve Social Interests or Special Interests?,
19 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 167, 174 (2009).
65 Powell & Chavarro, supra note 42, at 99.
66 Flanagan, supra note 61, at 15.
67 Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 56, at 266.
68 INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION CONST., pmbl., available at http://
www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/constq.htm.
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technical assistance rather than formal sanctions. 69 Arguably, attempting to
enforce a universal set of labor standards for all states without accounting
for their level of economic development will affect their ability to partici-
pate fully in the global market.70 No universal formula prescribes an effi-
cient way to incorporate labor rights into trade agreements.71 Because
conditions will be different for every party to a trade agreement, the worker
rights provisions must account for these specific circumstances. Thus
drafted, RTAs will provide greater opportunity to ensure the establishment
of more relevant labor standards and achieve increased enforcement of
human rights through trade.
2. The Effect of Labor Rights Provisions in Current RTAs
There are two important distinguishing features to look for regard-
ing the integration of labor rights in RTAs. The first is whether the frame-
work of the RTA includes integration of labor harmonization, that is, a
common set of worker rights that bind all state-parties to the agreement.
The second is whether the RTA includes some enforcement mechanism to
implement the labor standards, including, in particular, a provision for trade
sanctions for the violations.
RTAs that include labor rights provisions generally address both
substantive and procedural rights. Substantive labor rights include maxi-
mum working hours, minimum wages, and health and safety protections. 72
Procedural labor rights include the right of association and the right to col-
lective bargaining. 73
The three RTAs discussed herein mark the progress of labor rights
in Latin American trade. The first Latin American RTA discussed is
MERCOSUL (known in English as the "Southern Common Market"). We
then discuss labor rights under the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), its side agreement, the North American Agreement on Labor
Cooperation (NAALC), and the recently adopted United States-Peru Trade
Promotion Agreement. Although this article focuses on Latin American
RTAs, we begin by discussing the United States-Oman Free Trade Agree-
ment because it provides a noteworthy example of negotiations for a trade
69 Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 56, at 262.
70 Powell & Chavarro, supra note 42, at 99-100.
71 See Kristi Schaeffer, Note, Mercosur and Labor Rights: The Comparative
Strengths of Sub-Regional Trade Agreements in Developing and Enforcing Labor
Standards in Latin American States, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 829, 857 (2007).
72 Michael A. Cabin, Labor Rights in the Peru Agreement: Can Vague Principles
Yield Concrete Change?, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1047, 1051 (2009).
73 Id.
2011 127
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agreement that began a process prompting the emphasis of worker rights
that may not have otherwise occurred.
a. The United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement
Before the United States reached a trade agreement with Oman in
2006, the State Department analyzed the human rights violations committed
by the Omani government. 74 According to the Department's subsequent re-
port, Oman had "severely restricted" workers' human rights for many
years75 and noted that Omani labor laws prevented workers from having
procedural labor rights including creating or belonging to labor unions, the
right to strike, or the right to bargain collectively.76 Further, the few labor
laws Oman did implement only applied to Omani nationals; foreigners in
the country were left without formal protections, resulting in their suffering
from conditions tantamount to forced labor.77
Negotiations with the United States for the creation of a trade
agreement that included human rights standards pressured Oman to improve
its domestic labor standards. 78 By 2006, Oman had reformed its labor laws
and extended them to foreign workers in an attempt to comply with interna-
tional labor standards.7 9
The treaty between the United States and Oman was signed on Jan-
uary 19, 2006.80 By the summer of 2006, Oman had already issued a royal
decree revising Omani laws to meet certain ILO core labor standards,8 ' pro-
viding workers with the right to exercise procedural labor rights. 82 This is a
prime example of a developed country pushing for stricter labor standards
from an emerging market economy, which has resulted in significant
changes for the human rights of the Omani people.
74 HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 47, at 148.
7 Id.
6 Id.; Mary Jane Bolle, USA-Oman Free Trade Agreement, CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS 13-14 (Oct. 10, 2006), available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/75249.pdf.
77 HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 47, at 148.
78 Id.
79 Donna Borak, House Debate Oman Labor Rights in U.S. FTA, UNITED PRESS
INT'L, Apr. 6, 2006, available at http://citizenstrade.org/pdf/upi-housedebatsoman
labor_04062006.pdf.; see also HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 47, at 148.
80 HAFNER-BURTON, supra note 47, at 147.
81 Id. at 149.
82 Id.
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The United States-Oman Trade Agreement finally entered into
force on January 1, 2009.83 Since this date, the United States and Oman
continue to cooperate to increase labor rights as well as environmental
rights.84 The significant change in Omani law is exemplary proof of how
RTAs can be an important avenue for the enforcement of human rights. In
addition, the United States-Oman relationship is an example of how RTAs
can yield quicker improvements to human rights enforcement than global
treaties. In this instance, a human rights change that might have taken de-
cades under a multilateral setting was addressed more efficiently in a re-
gional setting.
b. MERCOSUL
The signing of the Treaty of Asuncion in 1991 established the
Southern Common Market, commonly referred to as MERCOSUL. 5
MERCOSUL's members include Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uru-
guay, making it the largest trade block in South America.86 The
MERCOSUL framework was initially modeled after the governing struc-
ture of the European Union.87 The Common Market Group acts as the major
83 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Oman Free Trade Agreement, availa-
ble at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/oman-fta.
84 At a February 7, 2010 meeting with the Sultan of Oman, Assistant U.S. Trade
Representative Christopher Wilson reiterated the U.S. commitment to labor rights
and environmental protections, and stated that "[t]he meetings in Oman are an im-
portant example of the United States' commitment to ensuring that our trade agree-
ments . . . promote enhanced protections for labor rights and the environment."
Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. and Oman Hold Joint
Committee Meeting of the U.S. - Oman Free Trade Agreement (Feb. 12, 2010),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/united-states-and-oman-hold-joint-committee-
meeting-us-oman-free-trade-agreement.
85 MERCOSUL is the treaty's acronym in Portuguese; in Spanish, it is known as
MERCOSUR.
86 When Hugo ChAvez withdrew Venezuela in 2006 from the Andean Pact of
Northwestern countries in South America, Venezuela's full membership in
MERCOSUL seemed assured. Brazil and Paraguay soon had second thoughts about
Chivez's plans to add political objectives to MERCOSUL's trade mission, and
Venezuela's membership is no longer active. See Joanna Klonsky & Stephanie
Hanson, MERCOSUR: South America's Fractious Trade Bloc, COUNCIL ON FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS BACKGROUNDER (last modified Aug. 20, 2009), www.cfr.org/pub-
lication/l 2762/mercosur.html (last visited Feb. I1, 2011).
87 Ljiljana Biukovic, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms and Regional Trade Agree-
ments: South American and Caribbean Modalities, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 255, 270 (2008).
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executive body of MERCOSUL and is given decision-making functions
that include monitoring, compliance, and enforcement of the Asuncion
Treaty."8 The Group is composed of four representatives from each member
state and may reach a decision only by consensus. 89 Using this formula,
MERCOSUL appears to achieve integration through a political process, but
delegates little power to the institutions themselves. Some critics view this
structure as demonstrating the lack of commitment MERCOSUL members
have for deep economic integrationo; we note, however, that the same
structure is employed in the NAFTA and the WTO, neither of which seeks
comprehensive economic integration. Nevertheless, the decisions made by
the Common Market Group are binding on the members. 91
While MERCOSUL contains general human rights language, it
lacks specific human rights obligations that establish members' common
commercial policy. 9 2 However, MERCOSUL members have made efforts
to improve human rights standards, which can be considered an acknowl-
edgment of the undeniable link between trade and human rights. For exam-
ple, MERCOSUL has commitments to core labor standards set forth by the
International Labor Organization. If a member believes another member has
violated one of these ILO commitments, the Commission on Social and
Labor Matters will review the allegations. 93 However, similar to the
MERCOSUL Trade Commission, the Commission on Social and Labor
Matters cannot impose sanctions; this power remains with the national
governments. 94
MERCOSUL members frequently meet in working groups and dis-
cuss policy objectives, including human rights concerns.95 Directly under
the Common Market Group are working subgroups that conduct studies on
88 Schaeffer, supra note 71, at 834.
89 Id.
90 See Biukovic, supra note 87, at 271.
91 Additional Protocol to the Treaty of Asunci6n on the Institutional Structure of
MERCOSUR (Protocol of Ouro Preto) art. 15, Dec. 14, 1994, available at http://
untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/12/10/4997.pdf.
92 SUSAN ARIEL AARONSON & JAMIE M. ZIMMERMAN, TRADE IMBALANCE: THE
STRUGGLE TO WEIGH HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN TRADE POLICYMAKING 106
(2008).
93 Pedro da Motta Veiga & Miguel F. Lengyel, Inter-American Development
Bank, International Trends on Labor Standards: Where Does Mercosur Fit In? 17,
Jun. 2003, available at http://idl-bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/bitstream/10625/27827/I/124
138.pdf.
94 AARONSON & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 92.
95 Id.
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specific concerns affecting MERCOSUL. 96 Created in 1992, Subgroup No.
10 on Labor Relations, Employment, and Social Security has pushed for
improvements by members in the areas of labor relations, employment and
labor migration, professional development, health, safety, and social secur-
ity by the oversight of eight committees.97 Subgroup No. 10 is also respon-
sible for defining substantive labor rights norms for MERCOSUL. In
making its recommendations, the Subgroup called for members to ratify
thirty-four ILO Conventions determined to be essential in achieving fair
labor standards.98 Further, Subgroup No. 10 created the Labor Market Ob-
servatory, which researches and analyzes issues relating to the labor mar-
kets of each member country. 99
In addition to the working subgroups, MERCOSUL members ad-
dressed labor concerns through the 1998 adoption of the Socio-Labor Dec-
laration. 00 This Declaration asserts a variety of labor rights, including non-
discrimination, equality, freedom of association, the right to strike, elimina-
tion of forced labor, and the rights of the unemployed.' 0 ' Unfortunately,
however, the document lacks a mechanism for enforcement.10 2 While
MERCOSUL lacks explicit protections for worker rights within the instru-
ment itself, members take labor protection seriously and have continuously
engaged in a standard-setting process to guide the national governments in
improvement of their human rights record with respect to workers. In 2009,
MERCOSUL created the Institute of Public Politics for Human Rights. 03
Headquartered in Buenos Aires, the Institute's purpose is to create, design,
and monitor human rights throughout the region in accordance with interna-
tional standards.'0 The Institute will conduct human right studies and serve
as a forum for further discussions among members regarding human rights
96 Schaeffer, supra note 71, at 834.
97 Id. at 836.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 835-36.




102 Schaeffer, supra note 71, at 838.
103 See About MERCOSUR, Human Rights in MERCOSUR available at http://
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issues. 105 Although the Institute seems to be a positive step toward the fur-
ther integration of human rights issues into the MERCOSUL culture, it is
unclear at this early stage what effect, if any, it will have as a future en-
forcement mechanism for human rights violations.
c. North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
NAFTA was one of the first RTAs with significant links to labor
rights. 0 6 The original NAFTA agreement did not directly address labor
rights. However, increased U.S. concern about the general effect of RTAs
on labor conditions prompted officials to reconsider the integration of labor
rights into NAFTA. One of the biggest concerns at the time was the Mexi-
can labor laws. Although Mexican labor practices appeared to be consistent
with most ILO Conventions, there was concern that they were not fully
enforced.' 07 These concerns eventually led to the promulgation of the labor
side agreement to NAFTA, the North American Agreement on Labor Coop-
eration (NAALC).10 However, NAALC lacks an effective enforcement
mechanism and explicitly allows each party "to establish its own domestic
labor standards." 09 As we noted earlier, the failure of an RTA to harmonize
labor standards to an objectively acceptable level, twinned with weak en-
forcement of this even lower threshold, portend an inauspicious beginning
of efforts to protect workers from human rights violations in the workplace.
The NAALC, along with its environmental counterpart, the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), are nota-
ble because they both provide for an adjudicative process that is open to
governmental and non-governmental groups."t0 The NAALC has a citizen
petition process that allows a private person to file a complaint."' Com-
plaints alleging that a NAFTA party is not enforcing its labor laws are sent
105 Id. See also News Ministerio de Justicia, Seguridad y Derechos Humanos de
Argentina, Comunicados de Prensa, (Mercosur's Creation of the IPPDDHH), Jul.
27, 2009, available at http://www.derhuman.jus.gov.ar/institucional/prensa/2009/
jul.html.
106 Cabin, supra note 72, at 1055.
107 Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 56, at 295.
108 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, available at http://www.
naalc.org/index.cfm?page= t47.
109 North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, art. 2., available at http://
www.naalc.org/naalc/naalc-fulltext.htm.
110 Ruth Buchanan & Rusby Chaparro, International Institutions and Transna-
tional Advocacy: The Case of the North American Agreement on Labor Coopera-
tion, 13 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 129, 131 (2008).
' See id. at 131 n.3.
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to one of the three National Administrative Offices (NAOs) representing
each member country.1 2 The NAO reviews the complaint, commissions a
legal study, and issues a report with findings and recommendations." 3
The NAALC goes beyond many RTAs by providing for the possi-
bility of using sanctions in the systematic reinforcement of domestic labor
laws.1 4 The process is a laddered step structure where only some of the
complaints can proceed to the second and third steps."' The first step in-
volves the consultation of parties, whereby the parties in dispute must make
a full attempt to arrive at a mutual resolution of the matter at issue.1 6 If a
dispute is not resolved by ministerial consultations, then a party can request
the establishment of an Evaluation Committee of Experts (ECE) to review
such matters."' Notably, disputes regarding procedural labor laws, which
include the freedom of association, the right to bargain collectively, and the
right to strike have no option for dispute mechanism and cannot be heard by
the ECE."8 In addition, the ECE may not be convened if the matter at issue
is not trade-related or is not covered by the mutual recognition of labor
laws.119
In the third and final step, an arbitral panel is established.120 How-
ever, this step can only be invoked in relation to three areas of labor laws:
child labor rights, minimum wages, or occupational safety and health.121
This detail is crucial because the only significant avenue of true enforce-
ment is to reach the third step, in which the arbitral panel has the power to
112 NAALC, supra note 109, at arts. 15, 21.
113 Buchanan and Chaparro, supra note 110, at 138.
114 NAALC, supra note 109, at art. 22-24, 29. The NAALC three-step process
toward adjudication consists of the following three steps: (1) anything within the
scope of the agreement can request ministerial consultations with another party, (2)
establishment and evaluation by the Evaluation Committee of Experts, and (3) es-
tablishment and evaluation by an arbitral panel; see also, Buchanan & Chaparro,
supra note 110, at 138.
15 Buchanan & Chaparro, supra note 110, at 138.
116 NAALC, supra note 109, at art. 27.
"7 NAALC - ECE's and Arbitral Panels, http://www.naalc.org/naalc/ece.htm (last
visited Feb. 11, 2011).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 NAALC, supra note 109, at art. 29; see also Bucahnan & Chaparro, supra note
110, at 138.
121 NAALC, supra note 109, at art. 27.1; see also Bucahnan & Chaparro, supra
note 110, at 138.
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levy a "monetary enforcement assessment."l 22 The possibility that any labor
dispute will survive this arduous process and that a monetary assessment
will be imposed for a violation seems remote.
The NAALC has been criticized because it does not establish a
common regimen of labor standards and does not have an effective enforce-
ment method.123 However, some critics believe that the publicity surround-
ing the NAO recommendations create pressure for governments to improve
their human rights record with respect to their workers.12 4 Many later RTAs,
such as the United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement and the Dominican
Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-
DR) followed the NAALC structure in implementing labor rights, causing
increased concern over the rapid spread of "soft law" agreements with re-
spect to workers. However, as described in the next section, the United
States would take an important step toward genuine enforcement of labor
rights in its negotiations with Peru.
d. United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement (U.S.-Peru TPA)
In 2006, the United States and Peru signed a bilateral free trade
agreement 25 that, in the pattern set by other recent U.S.-negotiated agree-
ments, contained labor and environmental provisions.126 However, a signifi-
cant difference in this particular agreement is that labor protections are
enforceable obligations that provide for the same settlement procedures and
remedies set forth in commercial obligations.127
The U.S.-Peru TPA requires that parties abide by the principles of
the ILO Work Declaration. Article 17.2 of the TPA specifically states that
122 Schaeffer, supra note 71, at 841; Trebilcock & Howse, supra note 56, at 297.
123 Buchanan & Chaparro, supra note 110, at 137; Stephen F. Diamond, Labor
Rights in the Global Economy: A Case Study of the North American Free Trade
Agreement, in HUMAN RIGHTS, LABOR RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 199,
216 (Lance A. Compa & Stephen F. Diamond eds., 1996).
124 See Buchanan & Chaparro, supra note 110, at 139.
125 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Peru Trade Promotion Agreement,
available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa.
126 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Trade Facts, Free Trade with Peru:
Brief Summary of the United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, Jun. 2007,
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/factsheets/2007/asset-uploadfile5
8513067.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
127 Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Peru TPA Facts, Real Results on La-
bor Rights: Facts About FTA Labor Protections and Peru's Labor Laws, Jul. 2007,
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Real-Results-on-Labor-Rights.pdf (last vis-
ited Feb. 11, 2011).
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each party must "adopt and maintain ... the following rights, as stated in
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its
Follow-Up."l28 Some of the principles explicitly stated include the freedom
of association, the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of forced
labor, the abolition of child labor, and the elimination of employment dis-
crimination.129 Thus, both members have committed to ensuring that their
domestic laws are in accordance with the ILO's fundamental work rights
principles.
The U.S.-Peru TPA also created a Labor Affairs Council that is
responsible for the implementation and development of the labor obliga-
tions in the agreement.130 In addition, the TPA provides for cooperative
labor consultations of the Council. If the disputed matter has not been re-
solved within sixty days of the consultation request, the complaining party
has the option to bring the matter to the dispute settlement mechanism.' 3 '
Unlike other RTAs, this agreement allows for the same remedies available
for trade violations to apply to labor violations.132 In contrast with the
NAALC, violations of both procedural and substantive labor rights could
result in dispute resolution mechanisms or sanctions.
However, the labor chapter adds a trade relationship test to its
broadened enforcement reach reminiscent of the softer language in the
NAALC.13 3 In order to qualify for dispute settlement, the challenged party
must fail to adopt or maintain the questioned regulation or practice "in a
manner affecting trade or investment between the Parties."I 34 At some level,
all violations of worker rights affect trade, but we do not know how broadly
dispute settlement panels will interpret this limitation. Nevertheless, the
TPA's enforceable labor and environmental provisions signify an important
step toward efficient integration of human rights and trade. If its provisions
prove successful, they may become the standard for future RTAs intending
to implement human rights.
128 United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, art. 17.2, available at http://
www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/peru-tpa/final-text.
129 Id.
130 Powell & Chavarro, supra note 42, at 119.
131 United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 128, at art. 21.5.
132 Cabin, supra note 72, at 1072.
133 See text at supra note 114.
134 United States-Peru Trade Promotion Agreement, supra note 128, at art. 17.2
n.1.
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B. Environmental Protection through Trade Agreements
Environmental protection and human rights go hand in hand. Clean
air and water, and adequate food and shelter depend on a healthy environ-
ment. There is an undeniable link between trade and environmental protec-
tion. Trade not only promotes the consumption and use of sustainable
resources, but it also inevitably exacerbates pollution. Notably, experts in
human rights and trade do not address environmental protection in the same
discipline as human rights.135 The failure to consider environmental protec-
tion as a human right bars environmental issues from reaching many inter-
national human rights forums, which ultimately affects these issues from
being considered in trade forums.
1. The Effects of Trade on the Environment
Economists believe that economic integration has direct and indi-
rect effects on the environment and sustainable development. 136 Many envi-
ronmentalists view economic liberalization as driving the demand for
greater consumption of natural resources. 137 Theoretically, the liberalization
of trade will likely increase economic efficiency and productivity between
the trading members, causing an increase in economic activity.138 In turn, an
increase in the production of goods and services likely leads to higher con-
sumption of natural resources, and increased pollution.139 These environ-
mental effects may reach the importing country as well as the exporting
country.140
A good example of the direct impact trade liberalization can have
on the environment is the Brazil tire dispute. Brazil has an active tire re-
treading industry. Its companies import used tires, retread them, and sell the
resulting product. However, many of the tires imported cannot be retreaded.
Brazil, however, lacks tire disposal policies; therefore, tires are simply
abandoned at any vacant parcel of land available. Ultimately, they collect
135 HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note *, at 86.
136 Kevin P. Gallagher & Jacob Werksman, International Trade and Sustainable
Development: An Integrative Approach, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE & SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 3, 5 (Kevin P. Gallagher & Jacob Werksman eds., 2002).
137 Id. at 4.
'38 See, e.g., Sanford E. Gaines, Environmental Protection in Regional Trade
Agreements: Realizing the Potential, 28 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 253, 256
(2008).
' See, e.g., id.; see also Charles E. Di Leva, International Trade and the Environ-
ment, 18 PACE INT'L L. REV. 227, 227 (2005).
140 See Gaines, supra note 138, at 256.
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water during the country's rainy seasonsl 4 1; this stagnant water provides the
perfect breeding ground for mosquitoes that cause dengue, malaria, and yel-
low fever.142 In 2002, Brazil suffered a severe outbreak of dengue, a poten-
tially deadly tropical disease caused by mosquitoes feeding on infected
persons and then spreading it when they bite others.14 3
In an attempt to address the health epidemic caused by these aban-
doned tires, the Brazilian Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign
Trade subsequently banned imports of retreaded and used tires."44 Two dis-
pute settlement proceedings, however, frustrated Brazil's attempt at a total
ban of old tires. Uruguay, like Brazil a member of MERCOSUL, chal-
lenged the ban before the MERCOSUL's dispute settlement tribunal, which
found that under the terms of that agreement, Brazil must exclude all
MERCOSUL members from the ban.14 5 Importers of used tires, deprived of
input, successfully challenged the ban of "used" tires in the Brazilian court
system.146
Against this background, the European Union challenged the ban
under the WTO's dispute settlement system where, among other arguments,
it noted that the partial ban had the result of completely protecting Brazil's
retreading industry from outside competition while providing ready access
to that industry of old tires needed for the retreading process.147 The World
Trade Court ultimately declared that although a general ban could be justi-
fied under Article XX(b)'s exception for measures necessary to protect pub-
141 AARONSON & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 92, at 94.
142 The Brazil-Retreaded Tires Case, Background Paper, Center for International
Environmental Law, Mar. 2006, http://www.ciel.org/Publications/BrazilTires_3
Apr06.pdf (last visited Feb. 11, 2011) [hereafter Brazil-Tire].
143 See World Trade Organization, Panel Report, Brazil - Measures Affecting Im-
ports of Retreaded Tyres, 4.28, WT/DS332/R, Jun. 12, 2007, available at http://
www.wto.orglenglish/tratop-e/dispu.e/cases e/ds332_e.htm.
144 AARONSON & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 92, at 95. Retreaded tires are also, of
course, "used." However, they are classified separately under the Harmonized
Commodity Description and Coding System, a detailed and logical numerical sys-
tem for distinguishing some 5,000 commodities administered by the World Cus-
toms Organization and used by about 200 countries to set up their national customs
tariff and for the collection of economic statistical data. World Customs Organiza-
tion, What is the Harmonized System, http://www.wcoomd.org/hsharmonized
system.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
145 AARONSON & ZIMMERMAN, supra note 92, at 95.
146 Panel Report, supra note 143, at 1 7.291.
147 WTO, Brazil - Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, http://www.
wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu e/casesfe/ds332_e.htm (last visited May 19, 2011).
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lic health, Brazil's selective ban was "unjustifiably discriminatory" because
the exclusion of MERCOSUL members and used tires from abroad clearly
did not contribute to the protection of public health and, in fact, had the
opposite effect.148 As this example demonstrates, the linkage between trade
and the need for environmental protection is easily proven. The commit-
ment that parties make by joining trade agreements inevitably affects the
ecosystem in which that trade takes place. This symbiotic relationship ar-
gues strongly for including environmental protection provisions in these
trade agreements.
In addition to concern for the effects in countries that lack local
environmental regulations, some commentators believe that the lack of
linkage in trade rules to the environment reduces the effectiveness of local
environmental regulations already in existence. One worry is that because
trade rules do not allow members to discriminate against imported goods,
they are forcing countries to accept products manufactured in a manner that
is below their environmental regulatory standards.14 9
Another negative effect of a lack of environmental standards in
trade agreements is what has been dubbed the "competitiveness effect." 50
The theory behind this effect is that producers required to meet higher envi-
ronmental standards will be at a competitive disadvantage when competing
with foreign producers complying with lower environmental standards.'
The political consequence is that the political pressure to protect domestic
business will strengthen opposition to higher environmental standards, thus
creating a chilling effect on governmental agencies considering higher envi-
ronmental regulatory standards. 5 2 On the other hand, opponents of the inte-
gration of environmental policy with trade rules argue that requiring
imports to meet domestic standards restricts emerging market countries
148 World Trade Organization Appellate Body Report, Brazil - Measures Affecting
Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 228, WT/DS332/AB/R, Dec. 3, 2007, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispuse/cases_e/ds332_e.htm. Article XXIV:
12 requires that the provisions of GATT be observed by both the central govern-
ment and the local authorities of a Member, and that the central government is
responsible for ensuring observance of GATT provisions by its local authorities. In
this case, despite Brazil's attempt to ban imported used tires without exception, it
bore responsibility for the decision of its courts, including the judicial authority it
had delegated to the MERCOSUL dispute settlement tribunal.
149 Gaines, supra note 138, at 254.
15o Id. at 255.
151 Id.
152 Id.
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from accessing larger markets, 53 and that stricter environmental policies
will become a pretext for protectionism that will deprive them of the wealth
they need for further development.15 4 Thus, trade liberalization will be neg-
atively impacted by environmental burdens. 55
2. Regional Trade Agreements and Environmental Policies
One of the main advantages that regional trade agreements have is
the geographic proximity of their Members. This proximity means that
member countries of a regional trade agreement will most likely be ecologi-
cally similar.'56 Agreements between countries with shared ecologies would
particularly benefit from environmental protection because the environmen-
tal behavior in one country could directly affect the other country.'57 This
dynamic is especially true in South America, where the Amazon Rainforest
encompasses regions belonging to nine countries. In addition, specific envi-
ronmental issues that should be addressed can more readily be identified at
a regional level. As such, the development of environmental solutions and
attainment of a mutual consensus for the development of specific mecha-
nisms addressing those issues is easier to achieve at a regional level than at
a multilateral level.' 58 Therefore, theoretically, RTAs such as MERCOSUL,
NAFTA, CAFTA-DR, and the Andean Pact have the geographical advan-
tage to provide the inarguable premises for environmental preservation
through trade.
3. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
In addition to NAALC, NAFTA members succeeded in adopting
the NAAEC side agreement. The NAAEC established the Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (CEC) to mitigate regional environmental con-
cerns and conflicts, and encourage the enforcement of environmental
153 JOHN J. AUDLEY, GREEN POLITICS AND GLOBAL TRADE: NAFTA AND THE Fu-
TURE OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLrrIcs 39 (1997).
154 Di Leva, supra note 139, at 228; Daniel C. Esty, Bridging the Trade-Environ-
ment Divide, in THE EARTHSCAN READER ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE & SUSTAINA-
BLE DEVELOPMENT 186, 190 (Kevin P. Gallagher & Jacob Werksman, eds., 2002).
55 Esty, supra note 154, at 190.
56 Gaines, supra note 138, at 262-65.
157 See id.
158 Id. at 265.
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laws. 5 9 The NAAEC does not set any particular environmental standards
but merely provides that each party ensures their domestic laws include
high standards of environmental protection.160
Regardless of the problems embodied by these weak environmental
provisions, the NAAEC does include several mechanisms for environmen-
tal transparency and dispute resolution. For example, similar to NAALC,
the NAAEC also provides for a submission process where citizens are able
to submit a complaint to the CEC when a party is failing to enforce environ-
mental laws.161 If the Secretariat considers the submission and warrants the
need for a factual record, the Secretariat may only prepare a record with a
two-thirds approval by the Council.16 2 To date, there have been seventy-five
complaints submitted to the CEC.163 Of these, only sixteen factual records
have been produced.' 64 These statistics leave some critics doubting the ef-
fectiveness of this procedure. Moreover, although any citizen may submit a
complaint, submissions have been made by non-governmental organiza-
tions, suggesting that the procedure might be too cumbersome or that indi-
viduals lack the time or financial resources to complete a complaint.165
Some critics also argue that the CEC can easily undermine the citizen sub-
mission process.166 These critics specifically point to the result of the Onta-
rio Logging Submission, where, despite the Secretariat's recommendation
for a factual record, the CEC initially refused to review the submission.167
In that instance, the complaint included factual models estimating the envi-
ronmental damage that would be caused by Canada's logging operations.
159 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation [hereinafter
NAAEC] art. 10, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, available at http://www.cec.org/
Page.asp?PagelD=1226&SiteNodelD=567.
160 Id. at art. 3.
161 Id. at arts. 14-15.
162 Id. at art. 15.
163 CEC Registry of Citizen Submissions, available at http://www.cec.org/Page.
asp?PagelD=75 I &SiteNodelD=250.
164 Id.
165 See Jonathan G. Dorn, NAAEC Citizen Submissions Against Mexico: An Analy-
sis of the Effectiveness of a Participatory Approach to Environmental Law Enforce-
ment, 20 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 129, 138 (2007).
166 See Chris Wold, Evaluating NAFTA and the Commission for Environmental
Cooperation: Lessons for Integrating Trade and Environment in Free Trade Agree-
ments, 28 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REv. 201, 229-30 (2008).
167 Commission for Environmental Cooperation [CEC], Council Res. 03-05, CEC
Doc. C/C.01/03-02/RES/05/final, Apr. 22, 2003, available at http://www.cec.org/
Storage/72/6574_02- 1-RES-E.pdf.
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The CEC, however, demanded that the complainants submit data showing
the actual environmental damage that the logging had already caused.168
Thus, in the absence of a treaty mandate requiring the CEC to take a "pre-
cautionary approach," the citizen submission process will remain remedial
at best, and it is unlikely to be used as an anticipatory means of environ-
mental protection.
Furthermore, even if a factual record of a complaint is published, a
party is under no obligation to provide the CEC with information as to any
corrective measures it has taken.169 Without any enforcement or follow-up
mechanisms, it is easy for the parties to simply ignore the findings of the
CEC. Nevertheless, the CEC has succeeded in accomplishing some notable
environmental outcomes. One of the most evident is the establishment of
clear strategies for managing toxic chemicals through its North American
Regional Action Plans (NARAPs).170 The CEC has already successfully
eliminated the use of DDT and chlordane.' 7 i
Several completed studies 72 evaluate the effects of the NAFTA
agreement. Notably, despite fears that the integration of environmental pro-
tection into trade regulation would pave the ground for a "race to the bot-
tom" scenario, some studies of NAFTA effects have concluded that
although trade liberalization could have been a factor leading some Ameri-
can companies to move to Mexico, little evidence shows that "large-scale
shifts in industrial investment and relocation to pollution havens have oc-
curred." 73 Despite strong criticism of the NAAEC procedures, many of the
168 Complainants alleged that Canada was failing to enforce the migratory bird
regulations because it allowed logging companies to destroy eggs and nests of mi-
gratory birds. See CEC, Ontario Logging Submission, (SEM-02-001), A14/SEMI
02-001/01/SUB, Feb. 6, 2002, available at http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PagelD=
2001 &ContentlD=2375&SiteNodelD=250&BLExpandID.
169 Notably, the Joint Public Advisory Committee recommended in 2001 that the
Council adopt a follow-up scheme requiring a report by the relevant Party to the
Council after release of the factual record. However, the Council objected to the
recommendation, concluding that follow-up schemes were the responsibility of do-
mestic law. Dom, supra note 165, at 140-41.
170 Wold, supra note 166, at 226.
171 Id.; see also Comm'n on Envtl. Coop. Fact Sheet on Chlordane (Apr. 2003),
available at http://www.cec.org/Storage/50/4282_chlordaneen.pdf; CEC Fact
Sheet on DDT (Apr. 2003), available at http://www.cec.org/Storage/50/4285_DDT
en.pdf.
172 Several of these studies are cited in J. F. Hornbeck, NAFTA at Ten: Lessons
from Recent Studies, CRS Report for Congress, Feb. 13, 2004, available at http://
fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/34486.pdf.
173 Wold, supra note 166, at 223.
2011 141
HeinOnline  -- 17 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 141 2011
142 BUFFALO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW Vol. 17
U.S.-negotiated RTAs following NAFTA have adopted the NAAEC's en-
forcement framework and have ignored the valuable lessons the CEC stud-
ies afford.17 4 To enhance the success of future integration of trade and
human rights into RTAs, parties should carefully review the results of pre-
ceding RTAs.
C. The Effects of Intellectual Property Regulation on Local Populations
Advances in technology have brought about new forms of trade in
the global market - most prominently, the transfer across borders of intel-
lectual property (IP) consisting primarily of patents and copyrights to origi-
nal inventions and other works. As much as half of the value of U.S.
exports resides in its IP content,175 such as the patent on a new malaria
medicine, the trademarked emblem on the hood of a Cadillac Escalade, the
copyright on a Stephen King novel, or the mask works on a semiconductor
chip. A strong indicator of the value of these goods of creative minds is the
appalling pace at which it is stolen, or, put more politely, "infringed." Esti-
mates of the annual cost to world wealth of IP piracy range as high as $983
billion. 76
In 1995, the WTO stepped into the enforcement arena left wanting
by dozens of years of unenforceable treaty making in the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO), a specialized agency of the United Na-
tions. 17 With its 150-plus Members and its near-automatic dispute settle-
ment system, the WTO's adoption of the tenets of the WIPO treaties into its
own Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
174 See id. at 205. Wold further argues that although the United States has claimed
that it has achieved further environmental integration in subsequent agreements to
NAFTA by including the environmental provisions in the RTA itself, "this benefit
is more imagined than real" because there is no legal difference to placing environ-
mental provisions in the agreement itself as opposed to placing them in a side
agreement. Id. at 236.
'75 Chris Cylke, The Facts on Counterfeiting and Piracy, Chamber Post, Mar. 7,
2008, http://www.chamberpost.com/category/author-chris-cylke/ (last visited May
18, 2011).
176 HERNANDEz-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note *, at 214; see also International
Intellectual Property Alliance, 2010 "Special 301" USTR Decisions, available at
http://www.iipa.com/pdf/IlPA201OUSTRDecisionsSpecial3O1TableofEstimated
TradeLossesandPiracyLevels061l 10.pdf.
177 A 1989 effort to draft a dispute settlement system that would make WIPO trea-
ties enforceable failed. See Edward Kwakwa, Essay, Some Comments on Rulemak-
ing at the World Intellectual Property Organization, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.
179, 184 (2002).
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(TRIPS) made the prior treaties both broader in reach and significantly
more powerful. 7 8
Intellectual property rights generally give creators the exclusive
right to use their work for a specified period of time (e.g., twenty years for
patents) and have been recognized in many international instruments, in-
cluding Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, which provides that "[e]veryone has the right to the protection of
the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or
artistic production of which he is the author."l 79
The WTO divides IP rights into two main categories: (1) copyright
material and (2) industrial property.s 0 The latter generally includes patent
rights, trademarks, and trade secrets. Patent laws are most relevant in our
discussion because it is the IP right that has recently had direct impact on
several other human rights enumerated in the United Nations' Universal
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.' 8 ' As discussed below, the
regulation of patents specifically affects two distinct human rights: (1) in-
digenous population rights and (2) the public right to health.
1. Patent Protections and its Effect on the Right to Health
During TRIPS negotiations, many emerging market countries ar-
gued for reduced patent protection of pharmaceuticals.18 2 Though policy-
based at first, these objections quickly turned toward a human rights justifi-
178 See HERNANDEZ-TRUYOL & POWELL, supra note *, at 213-14. Non-signatories
to the WIPO treaties were bound to their terms because the WTO allowed only one
kind of adherence, that is, to receive the irresistible trade benefits of some of the
WTO agreements, Members must agree to abide by the terms of all 24 of its agree-
ments. This single-undertaking approach added great weight to the WTO agree-
ments, both individually and jointly. See PETROS C. MAVROIDIs, GEORGE A.
BERMAN, & MARK Wu, THE LAW OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (WTO):
DOCUMENTS, CASES & ANALYsIS 9 (2010).
179 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 27, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., Ist plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948), available at http://www.
un.org/en/documents/udhr/.
180 WTO, What are Intellectual Property Rights?, www.wto.org/english/tratop e/
trips_e/intelle.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
18 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 31, G.A.
Res 61/295, U.N. Doc A/RES 61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.
un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/en/drip.html.
182 HOLGER HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE CASE OF PATENTS
AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 76 (2007).
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cation.'13 Critics of the proposed WTO/WIPO patent-protection system
claimed that the push for stronger IP rights infringed upon the right of ac-
cess to medicines essential to the health of a country's population. Stronger
patent rights allowed pharmaceutical companies to charge higher prices for
medicines, thereby taking these "essential medicine" beyond the reach of
most, if not all, of the sick in emerging market countries.
Developed countries have used RTAs as a way of increasing pro-
tection to their pharmaceutical industries 8 4 through "TRIPS-plus" protec-
tion for IP.185 These added conditions ensure tighter IP protection than those
required by TRIPS.186 Although the TRIPS Agreement powerfully protects
pharmaceutical companies through its patent provisions, it also creates an
exception for countries in dire need of medicines by permitting them to
issue patent-busting compulsory licenses,' 87 which allow a country under-
going a health crisis, such as HIV/AIDS or malaria, to license the produc-
tion of generic equivalents without consent of the holder of the medicine's
patent.'88 The WTO, in the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and the
Public Health, clarified Article 31 of TRIPS by stating, "[e]ach member has
the right to grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the
grounds upon which such licenses are granted." 89 This statement gives
183 See id.
184 See Cimbolic, supra note 28, at 58.
185 RTAs to which WTO members are party must, of course, adhere to the WTO
obligations of such members, including the TRIPS Agreement. "TRIPS-plus" refers
to the obligations unique to the RTA.
186 Mindahi Cresencio Bastida-Muiioz & Geraldine A. Patrick, Traditional Knowl-
edge and Intellectual Property Rights: Beyond TRIPS Agreements and Intellectual
Property Chapters of FTAs, 14 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 259, 287 (2006).
187 TRIPS: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
[hereinafter TRIPS] art. 31, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Annex IC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 313-14 (1995), 33
I.L.M. 1197, 1209-10 (1994), in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONs 381-82 (1994); Cimbolic,
supra note 28, at 58.
188 The member must nonetheless negotiate in good faith to arrive at agreement
with the company on "reasonable commercial terms" for the license. See TRIPS,
supra note 187.
189 This document was one of the principal agreements during key stages in the
ninth "round" (since GATT's creation in 1947) of multilateral trade negotiations
launched by the November 2001 Doha Ministerial Conference. World Trade Or-
ganization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health of 14 Novem-
ber 2001, 1 5(b), WT/MIN(1)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 available at http:/www.
wto.org/english/thewto-e/minist e/min0 le/mindecl-trips-e.htm.
HeinOnline  -- 17 Buff. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 144 2011
IMPACT OF NEW REGIONALISM
WTO Members free reign to create barriers to compulsory license access in
RTAs without fear of violating WTO provisions.
Developed countries have taken advantage of RTAs to prevent
these compulsory licenses from being granted. For example, the United
States has placed a five-year shield on the production of generic
pharmaceuticals in its most recent RTAs.190 The result was achieved by
prohibiting generic producers from using pre-existing safety data tests, es-
sentially obligating the producers to conduct the same time-consuming and
costly tests themselves.191 Moreover, the United States punishes emerging
market countries that fail to agree to these TRIPS-plus measures by using
the so-called "Special 301" list to label them as threats to IP rights.192 This
listing will scare away investors with IP needing protection.
It seems that in the case of IP, RTAs may have the effect of actually
increasing human rights abuse and strengthening the North-South divide.193
Nevertheless, as explained below, a possible change in the multilateral
arena might cause a significant change for IP rights in the negotiation of
future RTAs.
3. Acknowledgment of Traditional Knowledge and its Exclusion from
IP Rights
Consistent with the standards of the Western patent system, the
TRIPS Agreement makes patent protection available only to inventions that
are new, inventive, and capable of industrial application.194 This section ex-
plains that, while recognizing property rights, TRIPS standards essentially
ignore the identities and collective rights of indigenous peoples.195
In recent years, there has been a movement toward the recognition
and appreciation of the correlation between the culture and biodiversity of a
190 Cimbolic, supra note 28, at 59.
'91 Id.
192 Tony Dutra, Health Activists Say Special 301 List Targets Developing Coun-
tries Beyond TRIPs Minimum, 27 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1142 (2010).
193 "The most important social problem facing humanity at the beginning of the
21st century is the yawning divide in standards of living between the rich nations of
the global North and the poor nations of the global South." Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Bridging the North/South Divide: International Redistribution and Tax Competi-
tion, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 371, 371 (2004).
194 TRIPS, supra note 187, at art. 27(1); Prabhash Ranjan, International Trade and
Human Rights: Conflicting Obligations, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE 311, 313 (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2005); Cimbolic, supra note 28, at 53.
195 See TRIPS, supra note 187, at art. 27.3(b); see also Bastida-Mufioz & Patrick,
supra note 186, at 259.
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particular region.196 The knowledge and practices that local and indigenous
populations have passed on through generations have been linked closely to
the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in their communities.197
This knowledge exhibited by these communities living in close relationship
with biodiversity has been termed "traditional knowledge." 98 Traditional
knowledge specifically refers to the historical use of natural resources by
indigenous populations for medicinal, curative, and agricultural purposes;
as such, indigenous people remain the keepers of traditional knowledge.199
Given countries such as Peru, where the total population consists of forty
percent indigenous peoples, 200 it is evident why traditional knowledge is an
important concern in South American trade.
Traditional knowledge has been used as a tool for new product de-
velopment in the pharmaceutical, agricultural, cosmetic, and food and bev-
erage industries.201 However, indigenous people have been stripped of their
use of this knowledge by other intellectual property rights, specifically pat-
ent rights. Although traditional knowledge has been increasingly recog-
nized, it is generally deemed as non-patentable; as a result, it provides
fertile ground for multinational companies to expropriate traditional knowl-
edge freely. 202
Although RTAs have proved to be a fertile ground for enforcing
"TRIPS-plus" provisions, no such provisions have been used in recent
RTAs to further protect traditional knowledge. Traditional knowledge has
become a frequent subject in recent RTA negotiations, but has not been
included in the final provisions. In fact, the United States recently rejected
several proposals for increased protection of traditional knowledge in its
196 Susette Biber-Klemm & Danuta Szymura Berglas, Problems and Goals, in
RIGHTS TO PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: BASIC IS-
SUES AND PERSPECTIVES 3, 15 (Susette Biber-Klemm & Thomas Cottier eds.,
2005).
197 David R. Downes, How Intellectual Property Could be a Tool to Protect Tradi-
tional Knowledge, in THE EARTHSCAN READER ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE & Sus-
TAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 186, 190 (Kevin P. Gallagher & Jacob Werksman, eds.,
2002).
198 Biber-Klemm, supra note 196, at 15.
199 Convention on Biological Diversity, Traditional Knowledge Information Por-




201 Downes, supra note 197, at 372.
202 See Powell & Chavarro, supra note 42, at 101.
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negotiations with Colombia and Peru.20 3 However, one of the most intense
debates in the Doha Declaration discussions concerns IP rights. Paragraph
19 of the 2001 Doha Declaration states that the TRIPS Council should
study the relationship between TRIPS, the United Nations Convention on
Biological Diversity, and the protection of traditional knowledge and folk-
lore. 20 4 One suggestion at the Doha Round for future protection from bio-
piracy is to require inventors to disclose the source of genetic resources and
traditional knowledge as a prerequisite for patent protection. WTO Director
General Pascal Lamy has recently advised that, although the latest discus-
sions have focused on new ways to avoid bio-piracy and misappropriation
of patents, Members disagree on whether the solution lies in the inclusion
of specific protections for traditional knowledge in the TRIPS agreement. 20 5
The end of the Doha discussions will determine whether there will be any
progress for the integration of these human rights in the multilateral trade
arena.
203 David Viva-Eugui, Landmark Biodiversity, TK Provisions Accompany EFTA-
Colombia FTA, 3 Bio. RES. REV. 1, 1-2 (2009), available at http://ictsd.org/
downloads/bioresreview/biores3-2.pdf.
204 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/
MIN(01)/DEC/l, 41 I.L.M. 746, 19 (2002), available at http:// www.wto.org/
English/thewtoe/minist e/minO1 _e/mindecle.htm [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
205 WTO, Intellectual Property Differences 'Better Illuminated' - Lamy Reports,
Mar. 12, 2010, http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/newsl0_e/trip_12mar10_e.htm
(last visited May 19, 2011). The Director General of the WTO, Pascal Lamy, in a
speech to WTO members on March 12, 2010, explained that the differences in
consensus that the countries had "concern[ed] whether a disclosure mechanism, if
introduced more widely, would be useful and effective, whether the presumed ben-
efits for the system and for the holders of the genetic resources and traditional
knowledge would be experienced in practice, whether those benefits would out-
weigh administrative costs, and whether the disclosure requirement would enhance
or undermine the predictability, clarity and public policy role of the patent system.
In sum, there is general agreement on the public policy objectives, including ensur-
ing equitable benefit sharing, but differences clearly remain on how to arrive at
those goals in practice." Id.
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4. The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA-DR)206
Central America has the second highest death rate from communi-
cable disease in Latin America. 20 7 Guatemala suffers from high incidences
of malnutrition and starvation, as well as critical shortages in health care
professionals, medicine, and affordable health care.20 8 Consequently, the
majority of deaths in Guatemala can be attributed to easily treatable dis-
eases like respiratory infections, diarrhea, and malaria.209 Furthermore, the
country has an accelerating AIDS epidemic. The World Health Organiza-
tion estimates that there are 60,000 people living with HIV/AIDS in Guate-
mala.2 10 Access to antiretroviral medicines is crucial in order to combat this
epidemic. Thus, local IP legislation and trade commitments have an impor-
tant effect on the welfare of the Guatemalan people.
The issues related to IP were hotly debated during the CAFTA-DR
negotiations. The U.S. point of view was clear, and the United States
showed no restraint in pushing its ideals forward. The United States wanted
CAFTA-DR to be subject to patent rules similar to those in place in the
United States, 211 which meant that members would have to abide by TRIPS-
plus obligations. Under CAFTA-DR, pharmaceutical safety data were ex-
clusive for a period of five years, thus, making it extremely difficult for
generics to compete with brand-name pharmaceuticals. 212 It was clear to
Guatemala and other Central American countries during the negotiations
that such provisions posed a clear threat to the right to access essential
medicines. In 2004, the Guatemalan government issued a decree that per-
206 The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agree-
ment, Aug. 5, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-america-fta/final-text [hereinafter
CAFTA-DR].
207 Rahul Rajkumar, The Central American Free Trade Agreement: An End Run
Around the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health, 15 ALB. L. J. Sci. &
TECH. 433, 436 (2005).
208 Emily M. Cowley, The Right to Health: Guatemala's Conflicting Obligations
under the Central American Free Trade Agreement and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 11 MICH. ST. J. MED. & LAw 227, 239
(2007).
209 Id.
21o World Health Organization [WHO], Guatemala, Epidemiological Country Pro-
file on HIV and AIDS, fig. 2, http://apps.who.int/globalatlas/predefinedReports/
EFS2008/short/EFSCountryProfiles2008_GT.pdf (last visited Feb. I1, 2011).
211 See Rajkumar, supra note 207, at 455.
212 CAFTA-DR, supra note 206, at art. 15.10.1(a); GANTZ, supra note 20, at 194.
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mitted the marketing of generics with their brand-name equivalents to com-
bat the health crisis. 2 13 However, because of U.S. pressure later that year,
Guatemala eventually repealed the decree. 214
It is unclear what the exact consequences of CAFTA-DR will have
on Guatemala, but it is evident that IP rights, still a crude area of interna-
tional law, may have direct consequences on the right to health. As such, it
is important that future considerations regarding intellectual property rights
take into account the implications on human rights, including traditional
knowledge and the right to health.
111. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS FOR THE INTEGRATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
STANDARDS IN RTAs
The debate on whether trade agreements are appropriate for imple-
menting laws protecting human rights continues apace. However, the inevi-
table and undeniable linkage between trade and human rights has led to
dozens of contractual provisions in trade agreements that attempt to inte-
grate human rights concerns into the substantial corpus of both global and
regional trade rules. As multilateral trade negotiations progress at a crawl-
ing pace toward human rights considerations, the question now becomes
whether RTAs present a more efficient, appropriate, and effective forum for
the integration of human rights. This section discusses several positive and
negative considerations in response to that question.
A. Arguments in Favor of the Exclusion of Human Rights
Some fear that, like "wolves in sheep's clothing," advocates of pro-
tectionist economic policies masquerade as advocates of labor and environ-
mental rights because those issues are politically popular. Yet their real
purpose in including the human rights provisions in RTAs is to advance the
protectionist platform.215 For example, domestic industries might seek to
shield themselves from competition from lower-priced imports by advocat-
ing the inclusion of high labor standards in trade agreements with the ex-
porting countries.216 However, the enforcement of higher human rights
standards of course will raise production costs in these exporting countries,
thereby increasing the comparative advantage of their international compet-
itors.2 17 Thus, although higher environmental and labor standards might
213 Decree 34-04 (2004) (Guat.) (repealed Mar. 10, 2005).
214 Id.
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seem to serve a greater purpose, the integration of these specific provisions
might serve principally to protect domestic industries from foreign
competition.
Additionally, some experts argue that the integration of human
rights provisions in RTAs inevitably increases the North-South divide.
Since the signing of the GATT, the authority of developed countries to dic-
tate terms in multilateral negotiations has decreased. Currently, approxi-
mately two-thirds of WTO members are emerging markets. 2 18 The effects
caused by the change in membership class are reflected in current WTO
negotiation goals. Evidenced by statements made in the 2001 Doha "Devel-
opment" Round, a key goal is enforcing the WTO commitment to improve
the level of participation in global trade of emerging market countries: "We
shall continue to make positive efforts designed to ensure that developing
countries, and especially the least-developed among them, secure a share in
the growth of world trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development." 219
Thus, developed countries look toward RTAs to gain back their
control. The economic advantage of large markets, huge transnational
firms, and access to substantial investment capital provide developed na-
tions with outsized leverage in negotiations with emerging market states. As
a consequence, many of the human rights provisions negotiated arguably
serve the political and economic agendas of the developed countries rather
than the actual concerns of the regional partners about their failure to imple-
ment human rights obligations to the betterment of their civil societies.
The inclusion of even relatively ineffective standards may pacify
human rights groups that would have otherwise opposed the agreement. For
example, many of the earlier RTAs simply had provisions promising to
"promote" human rights,2 20 which arguably have the effect of being illusory
because there is no method of dispute resolution or enforcement. Thus, the
theory is that adding these provisions provides only an appearance of con-
cern for human rights without having to take a step further.
Finally, the sheer number of RTAs in existence today might also
inadvertently bolster protectionist interests. 22 1 As the number of RTAs in-
crease, it becomes impossible to identify which agreements connect which
parties and on what terms. As a consequence, human rights and environ-
218 Id. at 178.
219 Doha Declaration, supra note 204.
220 See, e.g., Preamble to the Free Trade Agreement, between the Governments of
Central America and Chile, Feb. 15, 2002, available at http://www.comex.go.cr/
acuerdos/chile/Texto%20del%20acuerdo/Preambulo.pdf.
221 Schmidt, supra note 64, at 174.
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mental protection advocates lose power and influence over the outcome of
these agreements. Furthermore, the "spaghetti bowl" 222 of conflicting and
confusing RTA rules of origin and other market access requirements might
overburden the WTO's review process of these agreements. Thus, the WTO
will have more difficulty keeping track of violations and maintaining con-
sistency in its recommendations. In the event that future multilateral provi-
sions prescribe minimum human rights requirements, many RTAs lacking
these requirements will simply fall through the cracks.
B. Arguments In Favor of the Integration of Human Rights into RTAs
There are several reasons why the integration of human rights stan-
dards into RTAs will be beneficial for the members of that trade agreement.
First, members of RTAs that are "regional," in the true sense of the term,
will likely share more similarities with each other than would RTAs that are
regional in name only. The geographical proximity is beneficial in many
respects, including, most importantly, similar ecological concerns. Because
a nation's environmental behavior may have detrimental effects in neigh-
boring countries, inclusion of environmental provisions will be more ac-
ceptable at the regional level than on a 150-plus member global level.
Moreover, geographical proximity may not only imply environmental simi-
larities, but almost certainly ensures comparable cultural and economic fac-
tors, including agricultural production, language, and indigenous
populations. These factors may result in an easier ability to reach consensus
regarding inclusion of human rights provisions in the agreement. Basically,
"[a]greements among smaller groups of 'like-minded' states . . . are easier
to negotiate" than agreements at the global level. 22 3
Second, some commentators believe that the greater influence of
developed countries in RTAs is a positive force for the inclusion of human
rights provisions. 224 Many believe that, unlike in the case of multilateral
agreements, political forces in RTAs are more influential and will likely
lead to the inclusion of human rights provisions that otherwise would not
even be considered. 225 Consequently, it would also be more likely that eco-
222 Jagdish Bhagwati, David Greenaway & Arvind Panagariya, Trading Preferen-
tially: Theory and Policy, 108 EcoN. J. 1128, 1138 (Jul. 1998).
223 GANTZ, supra note 20, at 18.
224 Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, The Power Politics of Regime Complexity: Human
Rights Trade Conditionality in Europe, 7 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICs 33, 33-34
(2009).
225 See Pengcheng Gao, Rethinking the Relationship Between the WTO and Int'l
Human Rights, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 397, 422 (2009).
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nomic sanctions will be used to deter human rights violations. 22 6 Although
some believe that protectionist reasons may underpin the inclusion of
human rights provisions, the harm that opponents claim these provisions
will cause to the emerging market countries has yet to be seen. 22 7 Addition-
ally, enforcement mechanisms at a regional level can be monitored better
than those at the multilateral level.
Many human rights advocates claim that the inclusion of human
rights provisions in RTAs complements free trade. Historically, developed
countries have dumped their exports in emerging market countries. Despite
arguments that the enforcement of human rights in RTAs increases the
North-South divide, some commentators believe that human rights consid-
erations will provide a level playing field between developed and emerging
market countries.228
Notably, among all the arguments for and against the inclusion of
human rights provisions in trade agreements, the most important factor to
consider is that there is a link between trade and human rights. Thus,
whether or not future RTAs include human rights provisions, it is evident
that the trade agreement will undoubtedly affect human rights in that mem-
ber country.
IV. CONCLUSION
RTAs have a number of advantages that are not shared by the
WTO. For instance, RTAs generally create more "transparency, accounta-
bility, and due process." 229 These qualities can be attributed to the new re-
gionalism's multidimensional structure. The geographical closeness of most
RTA parties and the small number of countries involved in RTAs provide
ideal conditions for tailored provisions that specifically apply to the needs
of members.
Nevertheless, debates continue as to what extent, if any, human
rights should be incorporated into trade agreements. The most common
claim opposing such integration is the allegation that human rights provi-
sions will promote protectionist use. However, these claims seem weak in
226 See id.
227 See, e.g., John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies:
Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1227, 1235 (1992).
228 See Susan Ariel Aronson, Is the Wedding of Trade and Human Rights a Mar-
riage of Convenience or a Lasting Union?, A Review of EMILIE HAFNER-BURTON,
FORCED TO BE GOOD: WHY TRADE AGREEMENTS BOOST HUMAN RIGHTS, 10 HUM.
RTS. & Hum. WELFARE 1-2 (2010), available at http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhwl
volumes/2010/aaronson-2010.pdf.
229 See Powell & Chavarro, supra note 42, at 96.
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light of the negative effects that non-integration would have on the individ-
ual rights of civil society in member countries.
Recently, RTA members have begun to include human rights provi-
sions in their agreements. The notable differences in human rights provi-
sions from earlier agreements, such as MERCOSUL, to more recent
agreements, like the U.S.-Peru TPA, show a significant trend toward pro-
viding enforcement mechanisms for human rights violations. Despite the
recent increase in the inclusion of human rights provisions in trade rules,
the language of these agreements clearly shows how members inconsis-
tently draw a bright line between trade and human rights. MERCOSUL, for
example, specifically prohibits labor requirements to apply to instances
where trade is affected. The U.S.-Peru TPA, on the other hand, requires a
trade relationship before a worker rights violation becomes actionable. We
have illustrated a few of the many avenues though which RTAs can achieve
further integration of human rights. Nations have an obligation to take ad-
vantage of these possibilities to combine greater economic integration with
the improved well-being of their people.
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